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RECENT CASES

It is submitted that the spirit of pragmatism and functionalism which pervade the federal system should similarly be introduced by the Court of Appeals into the New York law of
collateral estoppel. The court should abandon its archaic and
impractical standards and should recognize, in dealing with privity, as it has in dealing with mutuality, that due process of law
and reality are not incompatible.
JAMES W. GRESENS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A DRIVER INVOLVED IN AN
ACCIDENT RESULTING IN PROPERTY DAMAGE CAN BE REQUIRED BY
STATUTE TO STOP AND IDENTIFY HIMSELF TO THE OTHER DRIVER

On August 20, 1960, defendant Byers was involved in an
automobile accident which resulted in damage to another car.
Two days later he was charged in a two-count indictment with two
misdemeanor violations of the California Vehicle Code. The first
count charged him with passing another vehicle without maintaining the "safe distance" required by law1 and the second count
with a violation of California's "hit and run" statute. This
statute requires the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in damage to any property, including vehicles, to stop
at the scene of the accident and give his name and address to the
other driver.2 Byers demurred to the second count on the ground
that it violated his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
His demurrer was sustained by the California Supreme Court,
which held that compliance confronted him with "substantial
hazards of self-incrimination," but upheld the statute by inserting a use restriction on the information disclosed. The California
court found Byers not liable because he could not have anticipated
the imposition of a use restriction. 3 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 4 Held, the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination is not infringed by a state statute which requires
a motorist involved in an accident to stop at the scene and give his
name and address. Californiav. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
1. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 21750 (West Supp. 1971).
2. Id. § 20002 (a) (1).
3. Byers v. Justice Court for Ukiah Judicial Dist., 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 1057, 458 P.2d
465, 478, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553, 566 (1969).
4. 397 U.S. 1035 (1970).
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Although Californiav. Byers is the first Supreme Court decision involving the federal constitutionality of a so-called "hit and
run" statute, state courts have been grappling with the issue for
more than half a century. In 1912, the Missouri Supreme Court
held that disclosure of a driver's name after an accident did not
violate the petitioner's state privilege against self-incriminationr
The court said that the statute was a reasonable exercise of the
state's police power, and the fact that the driver disclosed his
identity was not evidence of guilt, but of innocenceY State courts
have upheld similar statutes on the theory that as a condition of
operating an automobile, the driver waives his constitutional privilege and must identify himself when he is involved in an accident." This argument has been disputed because automobile travel
has become a more vital part of our existence since the date of these
early decisions and to expect a driver to waive his privilege against
self-incrimination merely for the right to drive a car seems unreasonable. 8 It is also argued that there can be no loss of the privilege
without an express, knowing and intelligent waiver.
Statutes have been upheld where a person operating an automobile and causing injury to any person is required to stop and
give his name, address and license number to the other party, and
in cases where there is serious injury or death, to report it to the
authorities.9 In a more recent case, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court upheld a "hit and run" statute, but avoided using the
"waiver theory." The court argued that if a defendant could not
be required to comply with the statute, he could also refuse to
testify in a civil suit arising from the collision to facts showing that
he was the operator of the automobile involved. 10
5. Ex parte Kneedler, 243 Mo. 632, 147 S.W. 983 (1912).
6. The reasoning behind this statement is that in a classic sense flight is indicative
of consciousness of guilt and therefore, is circumstantially admissible to prove the driver's
actual guilt.
7. E.g., People v. Thompson, 259 Mich. 109, 242 N.W. 857 (1932); State v. Sterrin,
78 N.H. 220, 98 A. 482 (1916) ; People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913).
8. Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self.
Incriminationand the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 103, 143-44.
9. State v. Razey, 129 Kan. 328, 282 P. 755 (1929). See also Commissioner v. Zeitler,
79 Pa. Super. 81 (1922), where the court upheld a statute requiring a driver involved in
an accident to stop and help the injured party and to give his name and address upon
the request of that party. These statutes were held to be valid regulations under the
police powers of the state and in the interest of the general welfare.
10. Commonwealth v. Joyce, 326 Mass. 751, 97 N.E.2d 192 (1951).
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One instance in which a "hit and run" regulation was declared
unconstitutional was a municipal ordinance which required the
driver of a vehicle involved in an accident to make a full report
to the police. The Ohio Court of Appeals interpreted the ordinance as compelling the driver to answer all questions concerning the
details of the accident. However, the decision suggested that the
city council could construct an ordinance that would not violate
any constitutional right and still promote the public safety on
the streets and highways."
Because these decisions affecting compulsory reporting were
made before the Supreme Court applied the federal privilege to
the states through the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 2
these state tests of what constitutes self-incrimination in a regulatory area must now yield to the federal standard. However, the
problem does not end here, because, as Dean McKay points
out, despite all the discussions concerning values enshrined in the
right against self-incrimination, it is still difficult to define the
scope or state the central policy underlying the privilege. 13 Although the fifth amendment states that no person shall "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," the
privilege has been applied to civil, as well as criminal, proceedings, 14 and has been held to extend to testimony given before administrative agencies' 5 and congressional committees. 6 In the words
of Justice Blatchford, writing in 1892 in Counselman v. Hitchcock, "[t]he privilege is ...as broad as the mischief against which

it seeks to guard."' 7 The most comprehensive statement in recent
11. Rembrandt v. City of Cleveland, 28 Ohio App. 4, 161 N.E. 364 (1927).
12. 378 U.S. 1 (1964) . Justice Brennan, writing for the majority of the Court, stated:
It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity of a
claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending on whether
the claim was asserted in a state or federal court. Therefore, the same standards
must determine whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding
is justified.
Id. at 11.
13. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. Raxv. 193, 194.
14. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 US. 355 (1923).
15. ICC v. Brimson, 154 US. 447 (1894).
16. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
17. 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892) . This case involved a grand jury investigation of alleged
violations of "An act to regulate commerce." Counselman, who was engaged in the grain
and commission business in Chicago, refused to answer certain questions on the grounds
that they might tend to incriminate him. He was then adjudged in contempt of court,
fined and held in custody until he disclose the information demanded of him. The
Supreme Court found that Counselman was entitled to refuse to answer and directed the
lower court to discharge him from custody.
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years of the different values underlying the privilege is contained
in Justice Goldberg's opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission:'
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble
aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime
to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt;
our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitional
system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our
sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual balance
by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring
the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder
the entire load,' 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev., 1961),
317; our respect for -the inviolability of the human personality
and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where
he may lead a private life,' United States v. Grunewald, 233

F.2d 556, 581-582 (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd 353 U.S. 391;
our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization
that the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is
often 'a protection to the innocent.' Quinn v. United States,
349 U.S. 155, 162.19

While critics like Jeremy Bentham thought that the privilege
should be abolished,

others like Wigmore felt that it should be

restricted. The latter sought to differentiate between the "abstract
privilege-which is indeed a bulwark of justice-and the individual
entitled to it-who may be a monster of crime ....[T]he privilege
therefore should be kept within limits the strictest possible." 2' In
United States v. Sullivan22 a bootlegger refused to file an income
18. 378 U.S. 52 (1963). The California Supreme Court in Byers relied upon Murphy
v. Waterfront Commission to provide a precedent for judicial imposition of a use
restriction on required disclosures. The Court held in Murphy that (1) "a state witness
may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law
unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal
officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him" and (2) "in order to
implement this constitutional rule . . . the Federal Government must be prohibited
from making any such use of compelled testimony and its fruits." Id. at 79. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Cium. PRO. LAw § 190.40 (McKinney 1971).
19. 378 U.S. at 55.
20. The privilege is used to exclude "the very best possible sort of evidence: the
evidence the most completely satisfactory: evidence, in a word, so completely, and even

exclusively, satisfactory, that, according to the Roman system .... [it] is deemed conclusive .... ." BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827), VII Tiw VoRiS Or
JREMY BENTHAm 446 (Bowring ed. 1962).
21. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 n.1 (c)
22. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).

(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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tax return on the ground that it would incriminate him under
the National Prohibition Act. Justice Holmes was obviously reasoning along the restrained lines suggested by Wigmore when,
writing for the majority of the United States Supreme Court, he
stated, "It would be an extreme if not an extravagant application
of the Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a man to refuse
to state the amount of his income because it had been made in
crime."2 The Court left open the possibility that the defendant
could have refused to answer specific questions in the tax form,
but clearly stated that he could not abstain completely from making a return. Although the disclosure of the petitioner's income
might create "a necessary and essential link in the chain of testimony" 24 which could connect him with a crime, the Court chose
to limit the traditional scope of the privilege as announced in
United States v. Bur 23 in order to carry out the government's power
to tax.
A further restriction on the privilege against self-incrimination in the field of compulsory reporting was established by the
Supreme Court in Shapiro v. United States,26 where a witness was
compelled by an administrative subpoena to produce sales
records which he had kept as required by a regulation of the
Price Administrator.27 Such records were held to have "public
aspects" which rendered them at least analogous to public documents. Justice Frankfurter, aware of the serious implications of
the majority opinion, wrote a sharp dissent in which he made it
clear that he felt that criminals "should be detected, tried, convicted and punished-but not at the cost of needlessly bringing
into question constitutional rights and privileges."23 He also feared
23. Id. at 263-64.
24. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38, 40 (No. 14,692c) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
25. Id. at 40-41.
26. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
27. These records were kept under the Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, 56 Stat.
23 (1942), as amended 50 U.S.C.App. § 901 et seq. (1964).
28. 335 US. at 69 (dissenting opinion). Justice Frankfurter also wrote:
In an almost cursory fashion, the Court needlessly decides that all records which
Congress may require individuals to keep in the conduct of their affairs, because
they fall within some regulatory power of Government, become 'public records'
and thereby, ipso facto, fall outside the protection of the Fifth Amendment that
no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'
Id. at 37.
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that the Shapiro decision violated the right of privacy, for if
records required to be kept by law are instantly transformed
into public records, "we are indeed living in glass houses." 2
In a more politically sensitive area of required reporting,
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board3 held that an
administrative order requiring petitioners to register as members
of the Communist Party violated their fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Pointing to widespread use of the
reported data, the Court found the risks of incrimination obvious
since the admission of membership in compliance with the federal
statute could be used to prosecute registrants under several criminal statutesY1 Although there was held to be no distinction for
constitutional purposes between compelling an admission in oral
testimony and requiring one in writing, the majority opinion
stated the differences between this case and Sullivan:
In Sullivan the questions in the income tax return were neutral on their face and directed at the public at large, but here
they are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect
of criminal activities. Petitioners' claims are not asserted in an
essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but
against an inquiry in an area permeated with criminal statutes,
where response to any of the form's questions in context might
involve2 the petioners in the admission of a crucial element of a
3
crime.

The standards set by the Court in Albertson provided the
basis for later decisions in which regulatory statutes were found
to infringe a specific group's fifth amendment privilege. Marchetti
v. United States33 held that the federal wagering tax statutes vio-

lated petitioner's privilege against self-incrimination. The obligation to register and pay the tax involved a "real" and "substantial" hazard of self-incrimination rather than a trifling or
imaginary danger.3 4 Marchetti was distinguished from Shapiro on
the grounds that:

(1) Marchetti wasn't required to keep any

29. Id. at 51.
30. 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
31. For example, an admission of membership in the Communist Party could havc
been used to prosecute petitioners under the membership clause of the Smith Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2385 (1964), or under the Subversive Activities Control Act, 50 U.S.C. § 783 (a)
(1964).
32. 382 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added).
33. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
34. See Rogers v. United States, 840 U.S. 867 (1951); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896).
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records, but instead to provide information about his wagering
activities; (2) there were no public aspects to the information required from Marchetti; and (3) the requirement in Shapiro was
in an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry,
while the wagering statute was aimed at "a highly selective group
inherently suspect of criminal activities." Although the Court accepted the allegation that the government's principal interest in
enacting the statute was to collect revenue and not to punish gamblers, the characteristics of the activities about which the information was sought and the composition of the group to which the
inquiries were made brought the case within the A lbertson rule.
Similarly, Grosso v. United States 5 held that since payment
of an excise tax on wagering would have provided information
incriminating to the petitioner, he was justified in asserting the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. In Haynes v.
United States,36 a section of the National Firearms ActO7 was held
to violate the privilege because the registration requirement contained in the statute was directed principally at those persons who
had obtained possession of a firearm without having complied
with the Act's other requirements. Therefore, those registering
under the Act were immediately threatened with criminal prosecution. The Court pointed out that registration is not invariably
indicative of a violation of the Act's requirements; there are
uncommon situations where a possessor who has not violated the
Act's other provisions is obliged to register. "Nonetheless, the
correlation between obligations to register and violations can
only be regarded as exceedingly high, and a prospective registrant
realistically can expect that registration will substantially increase
the likelihood of his prosecution." 3 The Court held in Leary v.
United States" that compliance with the transfer tax provisions
of the Marijuana Tax Act40 would have required petitioner, not
by virtue of registration requirements but rather by virtue of the
requirement to obtain an order form, to unmistakably identify
himself as a member of a "selective group inherently suspect of
criminal activities." By requiring Leary, in the course of obtaining
35.
.86.
37.
38.
39.
40.

390 U.S. 62 (1968).
390 U.S. 85 (1968).
26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5851 (1964).
390 U.S. at 97 (1968).
395 U.S. 6 (1969).
26 U.S.C. § 4741 et seq. (1964).
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the order form, to identify himself not only as a transferee of
marijuana, but also as a transferee who had not registered and
paid the occupational tax, the law compelled him to expose
himself to a "real and appreciable" risk of self-incrimination and
violated his constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment.
In deciding the instant case, a plurality of the Court
considered first, whether compliance with the statute involved
a substantial risk of self-incrimination and second, whether the
disclosures were testimonial in the fifth amendment sense. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for four members of the Court, began
his discussion by stating that the tension between the state's
demands for disclosures and protection of the right against selfincrimination must be resolved in terms of balancing the public
need and the individual claim to constitutional protections. 41 He
cited the burdens of living in an organized society, filing tax returns for example, and pointed out that in each of these situations
there was a possibility of prosecution and conviction.
The Court found the requirement that a driver involved in
an accident stop and give his name and address to be similar to the
income tax reporting scheme in Sullivan since both types of
statutes are regulatory and directed at the public at large.4 Thus,
the Court sought to establish a similarity between the position of
the bootlegger in Sullivan and the petitioner in the instant case.
Following this train of thought, section 20002 (a) (1) of the California Vehicle Code was held to be essentially non-criminal and
regulatory. 43 Drivers who were forced to comply with the statute
were part of the general public rather than "a highly selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activities. ' 44 Therefore, the
plurality reasoned, the statutory disclosures required by section
20002 (a) (1) did not entail the substantial risk of self-incrimination which was found in Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes.
Not content to conclude the decision at this point, the Court
went on to state that even if the required disclosures could be
viewed as incriminating, they were not testimonial in the fifth
amendment sense. Although the Court conceded that stopping
might provide authorities with "a link in the chain of evidence
41. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971)
42. Id. at 430.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 431.

[hereinafter cited as instant case].
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needed to prosecute,

'45

the act of stopping was viewed as no more

testimonial than "requiring a person in custody to stand or walk
in a police lineup, to speak prescribed words, to give samples of
handwriting, fingerprints or blood." 4 Disclosure of the driver's
name and address was held to be an essentially neutral act, which
merely identified the driver and did not by itself implicate anyone in criminal conduct. The Court concluded that just as there
is no constitutional right to refuse to file an income tax return,
neither is there a constitutional right to leave the scene of an
accident to avoid possible legal involvement. The question of
imposing a use restriction, as the California Supreme Court did,
never entered into the plurality opinion since there was found to
be no violation of petitioner's right against self-incrimination.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan took issue with the
contention of the plurality that the disclosure of a driver's name
was not testimonial and that, in the instant case, there was no
real risk of self-incrimination. However, he felt the presence of
"real" as opposed to "imaginary" risks of self-incrimination was
not a sufficient ground for extending the privilege to regulatory
schemes of this kind. The application of existing standards in
this area can only defeat the state's primary and nonprosecutorial
goal of assuring personal financial responsibility for automobile
accidents given the necessity for self-reporting as a means of securing information. Harlan believed, along with the plurality, that
there is a need for balancing the right against self-incrimination
with the need of a modern society to ensure financial responsibility
to civil litigants in automobile accident cases. Despite his
disagreement with the plurality on several basic issues, he came
to the same conclusion, that in the event of an accident causing
45. Id. at 432; see Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); United States v.
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38 (No. 14,692e) (C.CD. Va. 1807).
46. Instant case at 431-32; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) ; United States
v. Wade, 388 US. 218 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Holt v.
United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910). The problem arising from the distinction between
testimonial and non-testimonial forms of evidence may be stated as follows:
I read a scene from Little Caesar
Modeled some of Dillinger's old clothes
Stood for hours in a lineup

Wrote some larcenous verse and prose.
I gave them the prints from my fingers
and the blood from my veins
But if I rob the local bank
must I leave them my name?
47. Instant case at 439 (Harlan, J., concurring).

517
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property damage the driver should be required to stop and give
his name, and that the purposes of the fifth amendment do not
warrant imposition of a use restriction. 8
In a sharp dissent, Justice Black wrote that the privilege
against self-incrimination is severely endangered by the plurality
opinion. If Byers had stopped and identified himself at the scene
of the accident, this disclosure could have been used by the state
to establish his guilt for unlawful passing. The California statute
is aimed at all drivers in the state who are involved in accidents
causing property damage. "If this group is not 'suspect' of illegal
activities," he stated, "it is difficult to find such a group." 49Justice
Black also sought to distinguish the instant case from Sullivan on
the ground that the only information the state required of
Byers was of a type which greatly enhanced the probability of
his conviction for a crime. Thus, the driver's failure to stop was
analogous to a taxpayer's refusal to answer a particular incriminating question on a tax return, which the Court in Sullivan intimated was constitutionally acceptable. Justice Black also rejected
the plurality's conclusion that the required disclosures were not
testimonial, for "[w]hat evidence can possibly be more 'testimonial' than a man's own statement that he is a person who has
been involved in an automobile accident inflicting property
damage?" 50 Rather than declare the law unconstitutional, however,
Justice Black agreed with the California Supreme Court's decision
to impose a use restriction on the required information.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion pointed out that the
plurality misinterpreted the Court's earlier decisions; they seem
to believe that membership in a highly suspect group is an indispensable basis for a fifth amendment claim. In the earlier decisions the crime-directed character of the registration requirement
was only found to be important insofar as it showed the substantial risk of self-incrimination faced by a specific petitioner in
a particular case. However, since Justice Brennan felt that a use
restriction would not adequately protect a driver from prosecution,
he advocated total immunity for those drivers reporting their
involvement in an accident.
48.

Justice Harlan felt that imposing a use restriction would significantly impair the

state's capacity to prosecute drivers whose illegal behavior caused accidents. Id. at 458.
49. Id. at 461.
50. Id. at 462-63.
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The plurality opinion is open to criticism on many grounds.
In order to distinguish the case from Albertson and the decisions
following it, the Court interpreted section 20002 (a) (1) as being
directed at all persons who drive automobiles in California. However, the compelled disclosures were not required of all drivers,
but only those persons who drive automobiles and were involved in
an automobile accident causing property damage. As Justice Black
stated in his dissent, "[i]f this group is not 'suspect' of illegal
activities, it is difficult to find such a group." 5 ' The California
Supreme Court took judicial notice of the fact that although not all
drivers involved in accidents are lawbreakers, a substantial correlation exists between being a driver involved in an accident and
being a driver who has simultaneously violated one or more
vehicle laws. Certainly, a cursory glance at the two volumes of the
California Vehicle Code makes it clear that this is an area permeated with criminal sanctions.
A driver's identification of himself as the operator of a motor
vehicle which caused property damage may be crucial in subsequent criminal prosecution. Other information held by the authorities may be sufficient to determine that whoever was driving a
given vehicle was guilty of a crime; the only remaining question
may be to determine whether a defendant was the operator of
that vehicle. 2 According to the standard set by the Supreme Court
in the highly significant decision of Hoffman v. United States,58
a person is protected by the privilege against self-incrimination if
it is "evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question
or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result." 54 It is hard to see how
the Court can seriously contend that it still applies the Hoffman
"test" and yet disallow Byers from claiming the privilege under
that rule.
The fact that the statutory purpose is ostensibly noncriminal
is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's right to refuse to incriminate himself. The statutes involved in Marchetti, Grosso and
Haynes were also purportedly noncriminal, but as Justice Har51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.at461.
Mansfield, supra note 8, at 122.
341 U.S. 479 (1951).
Id. at 486-87.
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lan pointed out, in agreement with the California Supreme Court
on this issue, the use of the privilege is not limited to situations
where the purpose of the inquiry is to get an incriminating
answer; it is the effect of the answer that is determinative.' Once
the group of drivers being regulated by the statute is limited to
those involved in automobile accidents causing property damagea group under "a substantial shadow of suspicion"r-and where
circumstances make it clear that a driver complying with the
statute faces a substantial risk of self-incrimination, the rules pronounced by the Court in Albertson, Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes
should be applicable. In each of these cases the crime-directed
character of the registration requirement was important only
insofar as it supported the petitioners' claim that they faced substantial hazards of self-incrimination and were, therefore, entitled
to claim their fifth amendment right. It should be noted that in
Marchetti the Court did not declare the wagering statute invalid
under all circumstances, but held that in cases where a party could
not show substantial hazards of self-incrimination, he could not
claim the privilege. In the instant case, Byers was guilty of unlawful 'passing which resulted in an automobile accident. Had he
stopped at the scene of the accident to identify himself, he would
have faced as substantial a risk of incriminating himself for his
traffic offense as would a gambler by complying with the wagering
tax statute.
The finding of the plurality that a driver's disclosure of his
name and address at the scene of an accident in which he was
involved is not testimonial rests more on fantasy than on any judicial precedents. From a defendant-driver's statement of identification an inference can be drawn that the driver believed that he
was the operator of a vehicle involved in a particular accident. "
From this inference the trier of fact can then infer the ultimate
fact that the defendant actually was the operator involved in the
accident. When evidence of this self-identification is introduced
at trial, it is not only "testimonial," but in many cases also highly
incriminating.
55.
56.
465, 470,
57.

Instant case at 436-37.
Byers v. Justice Court for Ukiah Judicial Dist., 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 1046, 458 P.2d
80 Cal. Rptr. 553, 558 (1969).
Mansfield, supra note 8, at 123.
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The plurality's attempt to justify its conclusion that the disclosures are not "communicative" or "testimonial" by using the
Court's earlier decisions also meets with failure, at least from a
logical standpoint. In Holt v. United States,58 the Court held that
defendant could be required to try on a blouse as a means of
identification because the fifth amendment prohibits "the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him
[defendant], not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it
may be material."5 9 Schmerber v. California" held that a suspect's
blood could be taken from him against his will and used as evidence
against him. The Court in United States v. Wade 1 required a suspect to recite certain words purportedly uttered by a bank robber. Similarly, handwriting samples have also been considered outIn deciding this issue, the Court
side the scope of the privilege.
62
stated in Gilbertv. California:
One's voice and handwriting are, of course, means of communication. It by no means follows, however, that every compulsion of an accused to use his voice or write compels a communication within the cover of the privilege. A mere hand:
writing exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written,
like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside its protection.0 3

It is this basic distinction that the plurality misses in the instant
case. When a driver is required to stop and give his name, it is
not the quality of his voice that the statute aims at, but the communication that he believes he is the driver involved in a particular accident. Another important difference between the circumstances in the instant case and those in the cited cases is that in
the latter, the person required to give his blood or fingerprints
was already a suspect. Since under present conditions traffic police
face a virtually insurmountable task in locating "hit and run"
drivers,

4

and the chances of apprehension for a particular traffic

violation are very low, a driver's communication that he was in58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

218 US. 245 (1910).
Id. at 252-53.
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
388 US. 218 (1967).
388 US. 263 (1967).
Id. at 266-67.
Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence, 67 MxcH.
L. REV. 421,434 (1969).
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wolved in an accident may be the only source of information connecting him with a crime. Once the driver stops, he allows eyewitnesses to better identify him, the police to photograph him,
take fingerprints and conduct tests on his vehicle.65
From a utilitarian point of view it is difficult to see how the
Supreme Court's decision in the instant case helps to expedite
the prime aim of the statute, which is to facilitate the settlement
of tort claims arising from automobile accidents. For example, if
a driver hits a parked car and leaves his name and address, the state
can collect evidence and build up a criminal case against him.
However, if he leaves the scene of the accident, he has a good
chance of escaping all criminal, as well as civil, liability. If the
Court had placed a use restriction on the information disclosed, as
did the California Supreme Court, the driver, by stopping, would
only face civil liability and a possible raise in his insurance rates,
which is not a great deterrent. Therefore, the Supreme Court decision may operate as an incentive for drivers involved in accidents
who face a substantial risk of criminal prosecution for driving violations to just keep going. If a guilty driver complies with the
statute and the state is not allowed to use this information or any
leads therefrom as evidence against him, the state is in no worse
a position than it was before. The state has lost nothing but
certain information it would not have possessed without the
driver's voluntarily stopping and leaving his name and address.
Therefore, placing a use restriction on the required disclosures
fulfills the legislative intent of facilitating the settlement of tort
claims arising from automobile accidents without unnecessarily
infringing upon any constitutional rights.
Justice Harlan's argument that a use restriction places an
undue burden on the state is weakened by the fact that the California state legislature did place such a use restriction on information disclosed by drivers who are involved in accidents resulting
in personal injury or death,66 which are obviously more serious
than damage to property. However, there is no need for full transactional immunity, as Justice Brelnnan suggests in his dissenting
opinion, as long as the prosecution has the burden of proving that
its evidence did not arise in any way from the driver's disclosures
and the courts rigidly enforce this requirement.
65. See Mansfield, supra note 8, at 121-25.
66. CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 20012-13 (West 1971).
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Studying the plurality opinion, one is bound to consider
whether the Court is deliberately contorting its logic to reach adecision on public policy grounds. The plurality clearly desires.
to ensure financial security in automobile accident cases and also,
to apply criminal sanctions to drivers whose violation of a statevehicle law has resulted in an accident. In the same skeptical mood,.
one may also question the motives of the California legislators in
drafting the statute. Was the sole intention of the legislators to,
stimulate the settlement of civil suits or was this avowed purpose
merely a means of achieving their prime objective of aiding the
state's prosecution of criminal violators in this area? The members
of the California legislature must have been aware of the fact that
a statute openly seeking to facilitate criminal prosecutions would
have been struck down by the courts as violating the fifth amendment and they skillfully circumvented this objection with a law
that achieved the same unconstitutional results. One must admire
Justice Harlan's candor in admitting that the driver in the instant
case faced a substantial risk of incriminating himself and that this
infringement of a constitutional right should be tolerated in the
interest of meeting the needs of society resulting from technological progress.
While the end sought by the Court may be socially desirable,
one must necessarily question whether the resulting infringment
upon constitutional rights is too costly a price to pay. Justice Black
is correct in his statement that in regard to statutes of this kind
"balancing inevitably results in the dilution of constitutional
guarantees."0' 7 Under the holding of the instant case, a legislature
could frame a law requiring a group with a relatively high degree
of criminality to incriminate themselves as long as the true nature
of the law is hidden beneath the mantle of some vague regulatory
purpose, such as facilitating the settlement of tort claims, an area
the state rarely seemed concerned with before. If the statute involved in the instant case had regulated an area of greater sensitivity than "hit and run" drivers (for example, a statute obliquely aimed at Black Panthers or prostitutes), civil libertarians
would have raised a furor over the threat to our constitutional
rights. It is pertinent to recall the words of Justice Bradley in
Boyd v. United States, 8 when a lower court required petitioners to
67.
68.

Instant case at 463 (Black, J., dissenting).
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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produce their books and papers for inspection by a government
attorney and to be used in evidence:
,Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the
aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, as before
said, it contains their substance and essence, and effects their
substantial purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing
in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and
unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way,
namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal
modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering
to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed.00

The California Supreme Court and the dissenting Justices on
the United States Supreme Court were aware of these dangers and
tried to avoid them by the means discussed earlier. To study the
plurality decision in the instant case after reading Burr, Boyd
and other early decisions dealing with the privilege against selfincrimination leaves one with an overwhelming feeling of nostalgia-"a wistful yearning for something past or irrecoverable. 70
BARRY BASSIS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EVICTION OF STATE'S TENANTS NECESSITATES A LIMITED HEARING ACCORDING TO THE STATE
ACTION DOCTRINE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

The appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Melvin Fuller, were low-income tenants in a state assisted and supervised, partially tax-exempted, private, limited-profit housing company organized under
the Private Housing Finance Law.' Pursuant to section 44-a of
that law, the Ebbets Field Housing Company, Inc.,' leased 20%
of its units to the State Housing Finance Agency3 which sublet
these units at a low rental, made possible by rental subsidies, to
69. Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
70. THE Nmv MERRIAM-NVEB5TER POCKET DICTIONARY 340 (1964).
1. N.Y. Pmiv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 10-37 (McKinney 1962).
2. The housing project was constructed by the Ebbets Field Housing Company,
organized pursuant to sections 10-37 of the N.Y. Private Housing Finance Law, for
middle-income occupancy.
3.

N.Y. PRiv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 43 (McKinney 1962). The New York State Housing

Finance Agency [hereinafter referred to as the Agency] is a corporate governmental agency,
constituting a public benefit corporation.

